Hezbollah’s African financial lifelines: A critical gap in U.S. counterterror strategy

In the wake of the 2024 war with Israel, Hezbollah has entered a period of profound weakness. 

Militarily depleted, politically isolated within Lebanon, and facing growing domestic discontent, the group is no longer riding high on its “resistance” image. 

Yet, even as its influence wanes at home, Hezbollah continues to rely on global financing networks to keep its infrastructure afloat — and one of the most overlooked fronts in that effort is Africa.

For decades, Hezbollah has quietly built a resilient financial base across the African continent. 

Its strategy has been opportunistic and effective: tap into large Lebanese diaspora communities, exploit weak regulatory environments, and embed operatives in legitimate sectors where scrutiny is minimal. 

From West Africa to Central Africa, the group has entrenched itself in commerce, construction, mining, and the import-export trade.

Key Nodes in the Network

Countries like Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Togo, Benin, Sierra Leone, Angola, and Nigeria have all been cited in intelligence and sanctions reports for hosting Hezbollah-linked financiers. 

These individuals and entities often operate under the radar, using legitimate businesses as fronts to channel funds back to Lebanon.

However, it’s the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) that has emerged as a central hub in recent years — not simply because of its lawlessness, but because of its permissiveness. In the DRC, corruption isn’t a side effect; it’s part of the system. And Hezbollah has taken full advantage.

The DRC: A Financial Conduit

Hezbollah operatives in the DRC exploit Congolese banks with lax compliance standards, move money through shell companies in mining and construction, and maintain ties with politically connected elites who help shield them from scrutiny. U.S. Treasury actions — such as the 2018 OFAC sanctions on DRC-based businessmen tied to Hezbollah — have illuminated just a small part of a much broader web.

Importantly, the DRC does not merely suffer from weak institutions; there’s growing evidence of active facilitation by elements within its financial and political class. 

Banks have processed transfers for sanctioned individuals. Officials have looked the other way. In some cases, profits from these transactions are quietly reinvested into local economies — giving Kinshasa every incentive to let it continue.

Why Africa Matters to Hezbollah Now More Than Ever

With its traditional fundraising channels in the Middle East constrained by sanctions, scrutiny, and war damage, Hezbollah depends more heavily on its international revenue streams. 

Africa serves not only as a safe zone for fundraising, but also as a pipeline for hard currency, gold, and diamonds, which can be laundered and moved discreetly. In countries where cash is king and compliance is low, Hezbollah’s global financiers thrive.

In this sense, Africa is not peripheral — it is central to Hezbollah’s survival strategy. That makes the neglect of this front in U.S. and allied counterterror efforts all the more dangerous.

A Failing U.S. Approach

Despite public designations and warnings, the U.S. continues to pour aid into countries like the DRC with no binding conditions tied to terror finance enforcement. 

There is little evidence that Kinshasa has moved to dismantle the networks operating under its nose — or that it has paid any diplomatic price for failing to do so.

Washington’s current strategy appears based on the assumption that these states are simply overwhelmed or incapable. 

But many are not merely victims of exploitation — they are willful enablers of Hezbollah’s financing model. Continuing to treat them as fragile partners, rather than as actors with agency, is a dangerous miscalculation.

What Needs to Change

To meaningfully disrupt Hezbollah’s African financing apparatus, the United States and its allies must act on several fronts:

1. Expand Sanctions Enforcement: Move beyond individual designations to sanction entire institutions, especially banks and commercial entities in Africa that facilitate Hezbollah-linked activity.

2. Tie Aid to Reform: Condition U.S. assistance to countries like the DRC on measurable steps to combat money laundering and terror finance. Empty diplomacy must give way to enforceable expectations.

3. Strengthen Local Watchdogs: Support African investigative journalists, financial regulators, and civil society groups who are exposing these networks at great personal risk. Their work is indispensable to long-term disruption.

4. Build Regional Pressure: Encourage African regional blocs, such as ECOWAS and the African Union, to adopt counterterror finance protocols and apply peer pressure on enabling states.

Final Thoughts

Hezbollah is not expanding; it is surviving — and Africa is key to that survival. The group’s decline in Lebanon has not erased the threat it poses. If anything, its financial desperation may drive it to double down on global schemes that operate in the shadows of underregulated economies.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo, and other permissive African states, are not just innocent bystanders. They are critical gears in Hezbollah’s machine. 

If the U.S. and its partners are serious about degrading Hezbollah’s capabilities, they must start where the money moves — and Africa is where too much of it still flows freely.