Lebanon’s new political equation

This week’s joint declaration by Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, vowing to prevent attacks on Israel from Lebanese soil and disarm rogue factions operating within Lebanon, may be more than just another political statement.

 It reflects a potential pivot point — a chance for Lebanon to assert long-elusive sovereignty and, possibly, to help reset regional dynamics that have remained frozen since the Lebanese Civil War.

For decades, Lebanon’s political and security landscape has been defined by fragmentation and foreign interference. Since the 1960s, Palestinian armed groups established themselves in southern Lebanon and within refugee camps throughout the country, operating beyond the reach of the Lebanese state. 

The influx of Palestinian fighters following their expulsion from Jordan in 1970 (known as “Black September”) further destabilized the country and contributed to the outbreak of Lebanon’s 15-year civil war in 1975.

The war formally ended in 1990, but full state authority never returned. Instead, Hezbollah, backed by Iran, filled the power vacuum, establishing itself as the dominant force in southern Lebanon and beyond. 

Though officially part of Lebanon’s political system, Hezbollah has maintained its own armed wing, intelligence operations, and foreign policy — effectively creating a parallel state. Palestinian camps such as Ain al-Hilweh and Nahr al-Bared have similarly remained beyond government control, home to rival factions including Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

The Aoun-Abbas agreement arrives at a moment of rare alignment. Internally, Lebanon is reeling from economic collapse, currency devaluation, and a massive brain drain. 

Its people are demanding reforms and accountability. Regionally, Hezbollah has suffered substantial operational losses due to Israeli strikes over the past year — most notably in the aftermath of Israel’s intensified campaign following the October 2024 Hamas-led attacks that triggered full-scale conflict across multiple fronts.

This Israeli military campaign — targeting Hezbollah arms convoys, command infrastructure, and supply lines — has exposed Hezbollah’s vulnerabilities and disrupted its ability to project power. 

That erosion of influence has opened an unexpected window for the Lebanese state to reassert control, particularly in the south and within areas long dominated by proxy forces.

Against this backdrop, Abbas’s visit — his first to Lebanon in seven years — takes on added significance. He and Aoun not only called for the disarmament of Palestinian factions outside the state’s authority but also announced the formation of a political-security committee to oversee the process and address living conditions in refugee camps. 

Abbas reiterated that Palestinians in Lebanon are “temporary guests” and reaffirmed the principle of “one state, one law, one army, and one legitimate weapon.”

-If realized, this agreement would signal an unprecedented shift. For Lebanon, it could be the start of actual sovereignty — not just in name, but in practice.

 The Lebanese state has for decades outsourced control of its territory to militias, sometimes by necessity, often by design. Ending that arrangement would be transformational, particularly in the south, which has seen repeated rounds of violence with Israel due to rocket fire by Hamas or Hezbollah.

Equally important, the pact could open the door to quiet regional recalibration. Though Lebanon and Israel remain officially at war and have no diplomatic ties, there has been low-level coordination in recent years on border demarcation issues, such as the 2022 U.S.-brokered maritime gas agreement. 

A Lebanon free of Hezbollah’s and Hamas’s military presence would fundamentally change Israel’s threat calculus on its northern border — and could create conditions for more pragmatic, even if unofficial, dialogue.

Israel’s leadership would no doubt welcome a Lebanese government that could credibly guarantee security along the border. Such a shift would also ease strain on Israel’s overstretched military, which has been forced to juggle threats in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, and increasingly, the Red Sea.

Still, implementation remains the core challenge. Abbas has limited influence over Hamas and other factions entrenched in Lebanon’s camps. 

Many of these groups are armed, ideologically opposed to the Palestinian Authority, and often more loyal to external patrons like Iran. Hezbollah, too, is unlikely to quietly relinquish its hold on southern Lebanon — though its current weakened state may force it into a more defensive posture.

Moreover, Lebanese politics remains deeply divided, and the army is underfunded and overstretched. International support — both political and financial — will be critical to enforcing any disarmament deal and rebuilding state institutions capable of maintaining order.

A Glimmer of Possibility

Despite the daunting obstacles, this week’s agreement represents a glimmer of strategic clarity in a region too often clouded by chaos and inertia. 

It offers a pathway — however narrow — for Lebanon to step out of the shadow of militias and foreign manipulation, and for the broader region to begin shedding the burdens of proxy war.

If Aoun and Abbas can translate this declaration into real policy, and if Israel responds with pragmatism rather than preemption, a new dynamic could begin to take shape — one that sees Lebanon not as a launchpad for regional conflict, but as a sovereign state charting its own course. That would be nothing short of historic.