Erdogan’s political experiment: The Turkish model for Syria’s new rulers

A new era in Syria has begun following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime on December 8, 2024, with Ahmad al-Sharaa, a former jihadist, emerging as the new interim leader. 

This shift has presented Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan with a long-awaited opportunity to shape Syria’s future according to his political vision.

In an interview with Le Monde, Ezgi Basaran, a Turkish political analyst specializing in the Middle East at Oxford University, analyzed Turkey’s involvement in Syria’s transition, the role of the AKP, and the implications for regional geopolitics.

For Erdogan, the current conditions in Syria could not be more favorable. The new leader in Damascus is a Sunni Islamist who has received significant support from Turkey and maintains strong ties to the AKP.

Erdogan and his party see this as an opportunity to demonstrate that an Islamist social movement can evolve into a legitimate political party, participate in competitive elections, and govern a nation. This strategy aligns with previous Turkish efforts to support Ennahda in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt after the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011.

The "Tactical Toolbox": A Roadmap for Syria’s New Leadership

Ankara is actively guiding Syria’s new rulers through what Basaran describes as a “tactical toolbox”, equipping them with the necessary political strategies to gain legitimacy at both the domestic and international levels.

This strategy involves:

- Establishing a credible governing structure to administer the country effectively
- Positioning Syria’s leadership as a legitimate actor on the global stage
- Forging alliances with local minority groups such as Christians and Druze
- Projecting a moderate image to distance themselves from their jihadist past

Al-Sharaa’s long-standing relationship with Turkey has played a key role in this transformation. He has been in direct contact with the AKP for nine years, primarily through Hakan Fidan, the former Turkish intelligence chief and current foreign minister. Fidan was also the first high-ranking official to visit Damascus after Assad fled, followed shortly by Turkish intelligence head Ibrahim Kalin, who was personally escorted by Al-Sharaa to the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus.

The symbolic rebranding of Syria’s new leadership is also evident. Al-Sharaa, a former jihadist, was recently seen clean-shaven, wearing a suit and tie, marking a significant shift in public image. According to Basaran, his attire was purchased from a luxury boutique in Istanbul, underscoring Turkey’s direct involvement in shaping Syria’s new political identity.

Turkey’s Regional Strategy: Winning Over Saudi Arabia and the UAE

Ankara recognizes that for an Islamist government to survive in the Arab world, it must engage with key Gulf powers—primarily Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Turkey’s diplomatic maneuvers have already borne fruit:

• On January 2, 2025, Syrian Foreign Minister Assad Hassan Al-Chibani made his first official visit to Saudi Arabia, a move strongly encouraged by Turkey.
• On January 12, Riyadh called for the lifting of international sanctions on Syria, signaling a possible shift in its stance toward the new government.
• On January 6, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan visited Abu Dhabi, paving the way for Al-Chibani’s subsequent visit to the UAE.
• President Erdogan personally contacted UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, urging him to "give HTC a chance."

Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt or Ennahda in Tunisia, the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTC)—Syria’s dominant Islamist group—has prior governance experience in Idlib, where it has managed essential services like water, electricity, and waste collection.

HTC leaders have adopted the AKP’s philosophy of state-building:

“Start by providing good services to the people, bring in and circulate money, and everything else will fall into place,” Basaran explains.

However, HTC still faces internal challenges, particularly its division between jihadist and non-jihadist factions. Its long-term survival will depend on whether it can shed its extremist label and present itself as a legitimate political entity.

The Gradual "Deradicalization" of HTC

The transformation of HTC—formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s Syrian branch—began as early as 2015, according to Basaran.

That year, Ayman al-Zawahiri, then-leader of al-Qaeda, issued a directive instructing al-Nusra to halt its international jihadist operations and focus solely on domestic governance. This decision caused significant rifts within the organization, ultimately leading to HTC’s formal break from al-Qaeda in 2016.

Since then, HTC has forged closer ties with Turkey, adopted pragmatic political strategies, studied modern warfare tactics, including lessons from Ukraine and Azerbaijan’s conflict with Armenia

Recent reports, including a December 2024 investigation by The Washington Post, reveal that HTC received tactical training from Ukrainian combat units and now teaches lessons from the Ukraine war in its military academy in Idlib.

Unlike the Syrian National Army (SNA), which is widely seen as a Turkish proxy, HTC maintains a more independent relationship with Ankara.

Turkey’s primary goal remains preventing Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria, an objective shared by HTC. However, the HTC leadership is not fully under Turkish control, making their alliance a complex and evolving dynamic.

The recent power shift in Syria has reignited debates about Erdogan’s alleged neo-Ottoman ambitions.

Basaran, however, cautions against over-simplified narratives:

“Neo-Ottomanism is a vague term that complicates analysis rather than clarifies it. Which Ottoman era are we referring to? The authoritarian rule of Sultan Abdülhamid II? The expansionism of Suleiman the Magnificent? Or the 19th-century Tanzimat reforms?”

She argues that Erdogan’s motivations are primarily domestic rather than driven by regional empire-building aspirations. His priority is to strengthen his political base in Turkey by crafting a narrative of success and strategic influence in the region.