Iran, January 2026: Same script, same illusions

By January 14–15, 2026, the pattern in Iran was already unmistakable. Casualty figures remain contested, but the essentials are not: mass killings, mass arrests, and an internet blackout to ensure that repression happens out of sight.

In the Middle East, none of this is surprising. When the Iranian regime feels threatened at home, it does not soften. It hardens, and it looks outward. Domestic crisis has always pushed Tehran toward escalation, not restraint.

Yet once again, familiar voices argue that this is precisely the moment for “engagement.” Channels must stay open. De-escalation must be prioritized. The nuclear file must be “kept separate.” In MENA capitals, this language is well known — and so are its results.

Every time Iran enters survival mode, diplomacy becomes a tool of the regime, not a constraint on it. Talks buy time. Time reduces pressure. Pressure fades , and repression resumes. This is not miscalculation; it is strategy.

That is why any U.S. initiative, whether led by Donald Trump, Steve Witkoff, or anyone else, should be judged brutally simply: does it raise the cost of repression, or lower it? Deal-making theater may play well in Washington. In the region, it usually reads as inconsistency.

The red line problem is not Iranian ambiguity,  it is Western elasticity. Lines move. Conditions soften. Priorities narrow. First it is “freeze escalation,” then “save the nuclear track,” and eventually “this is not the right moment to push on human rights.” Tehran understands this rhythm perfectly.

For regional states, the risk is obvious. A regime that can gun down protesters, shut off the internet, and still extract diplomatic concessions draws a clear lesson: force works. And a regime that learns force works at home is more likely to apply leverage abroad, through proxies, pressure, and calibrated instability.

This is why separating the nuclear file from internal violence has always been an illusion. Repression is not a side issue; it is the regime’s core instrument of power. Ignore it, and every agreement becomes temporary, tactical, and reversible.

The alternative is not idealism. It is leverage. Break censorship. Preserve evidence. Sanction individuals, not abstractions. Make command responsibility personal. Raise the cost high enough that repression becomes a liability, not a tool.

The Middle East has lived through decades of “pragmatic engagement” with Tehran. The results are visible from Beirut to Sana’a. Pretending that January 2026 is different is not realism,  it is willful amnesia.

Iran is not negotiating from confidence. It is maneuvering for survival. Treating that moment as an opportunity for business-as-usual diplomacy is not caution. It is repetition.

And in this region, repetition always ends the same way.