Nabih Berry’s stand: Resolution 1701 as Lebanon’s path to ceasefire, ignoring UN’s disarmament clause

As Lebanon finds itself under growing pressure to address the conflict in the south, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berry has made clear his stance: only UN Resolution 1701, which calls for a ceasefire, will be considered to end hostilities. 

For Berry, who is uniquely positioned as an interlocutor with the international community and one of Hezbollah’s closest allies, Resolution 1701 remains the focus. Rejecting any move to integrate Resolution 1559’s stipulation on disarmament, he has emphasized that “1701 and only 1701” is Lebanon’s path forward.

Resolution 1559, passed in 2004, demands the disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias — a clear reference to Hezbollah and Palestinian groups. However, Lebanon’s successive governments have endorsed Hezbollah as a “resistance” group against Israel, opposing the disarmament prescribed in Resolution 1559. 

Tarek Mitri, a former Lebanese minister involved in drafting Resolution 1701 in 2006, points out that while 1701 does not cancel 1559, Lebanon’s political leadership has resisted implementing both simultaneously.

In a statement to pro-Hezbollah newspaper al-Akhbar, Berry insisted that “Resolution 1701 annulled Resolution 1559” and expressed firm opposition to any “1701 Plus” plan that might combine both resolutions’ stipulations. Despite international calls to integrate disarmament into any ceasefire agreement, Berry’s stance has been echoed by pro-Hezbollah members of parliament, who emphasize that 1559 is not under discussion. As MP Kassem Hachem, a member of Berry’s bloc, remarked, the Lebanese government will not follow “international dictates.”

From a legal standpoint, international law experts clarify that UN resolutions do not cancel one another but are complementary. 

Sajih Sinno, an expert in international law, explains that neither resolution invalidates the other, with Resolution 1701 citing Resolution 1559 three times. Article 3 of 1701 specifies that the Lebanese government must extend its authority “throughout its territory” in line with Resolutions 1559 and 1680. Similarly, Article 8 of 1701 calls for “full implementation” of prior resolutions. 

In this regard, Sinno argues that applying only one resolution without considering the other “contradicts” Lebanon’s obligations to the UN Security Council, of which Lebanon is a member.

Hezbollah’s long-standing presence and influence in Lebanon remain undeniable, with current leaders avoiding any mention of Resolution 1559 to prevent political backlash against the Shia party. 

Even at the recent interfaith summit in Bkerké, where religious and political figures gathered, leaders called for a ceasefire under 1701, avoiding reference to 1559’s disarmament clause.

Hezbollah’s significant role within Lebanon’s political framework ensures that any conversation regarding disarmament is deferred until a ceasefire is achieved. 

Mitri confirms that the group’s influence remains strong, particularly in light of the ongoing conflict with Israel. This reality underscores the hesitation of Lebanese leaders to engage in discussions on disarmament, a topic unlikely to be addressed until hostilities end.

In Lebanon’s current complex landscape, calls to apply Resolution 1701 without integrating Resolution 1559 reflect the prevailing political strategy.