Egypt’s lesson ignored: The Muslim Brotherhood never really leaves

In the short term, the mood is almost celebratory. Hostilities have paused, hostages have been returned, and the guns have fallen silent—at least for now. 

The immediate reason? Hamas said yes. It agreed to a deal. But that "yes" raises more questions than it answers, particularly when we look beyond the momentary relief.

Because in the medium to long term, there's an undeniable unease. The underlying architecture of the conflict remains unchanged. And more troubling still is what recent diplomatic maneuvering reveals about who holds influence over Hamas—and why.

The New Power Brokers

Donald Trump understood one thing with unusual clarity: Qatar and Turkey have leverage over Hamas. Not because they’re neutral mediators. Far from it. Their influence stems from ideological affinity—both countries are aligned, in varying degrees, with the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamist movement from which Hamas itself was born.

This is not a minor footnote in geopolitics. The Muslim Brotherhood is not just a political organization. It's an ideology—a transnational vision of Islamic governance that blends religious fanaticism with political opportunism. It doesn’t disappear in defeat. It retreats, regroups, and waits.

That’s what Egypt learned the hard way.

The Egyptian Case Study

The Egyptian revolution of 2011 brought with it a brief political opening for the Brotherhood. By 2012, Mohamed Morsi, a longtime member of the movement, was elected president. But what followed was not pluralistic democracy—it was the slow, methodical attempt to reshape Egyptian society under an Islamist lens.

What started with political appointments and legal reforms quickly turned into intolerance, authoritarianism, and polarization. The Brotherhood showed little interest in consensus-building. Critics were silenced, media was pressured, and state institutions were gradually being bent to its will.

By 2013, mass protests returned to the streets. Egyptians, millions of them, concluded that the Brotherhood was not just incompetent—it was dangerous. The military intervened, Morsi was removed, and the Brotherhood was declared a terrorist organization. Since then, Egypt has cracked down hard on the movement, which continues to operate underground and in exile.

The lesson is sobering: Islamist movements with long-term ideological goals don’t disappear—they adapt. Retreat is not defeat; it’s strategy.

Turkey and Qatar: Friendly Faces, Familiar Patterns

So when Erdogan’s Turkey and Qatar’s ruling elite offer themselves as mediators in conflicts involving Hamas, it's essential to ask: whose interests are they really serving?

Erdogan himself has deep ideological roots in the Turkish Islamist movement, which drew inspiration from the Brotherhood. Under his rule, Turkey has positioned itself as a patron of political Islam, often giving refuge and platform to Brotherhood members from across the region.

Qatar, for its part, financially supports Hamas and hosts several Brotherhood-linked figures. While it publicly supports diplomacy and ceasefires, its money and media have long provided cover for hardline ideologies.

These are not neutral parties. They are not Switzerland. They are actors with a stake in the outcome.

It’s tempting to see the return of hostages and the current ceasefire as a breakthrough. And for the families affected, it certainly is. But it would be dangerously naïve to mistake tactical concessions for strategic change.

Islamist groups like Hamas, rooted in the worldview of the Muslim Brotherhood, don’t negotiate for peace—they negotiate for time. Repression, exile, and setbacks don’t dissuade them. They see themselves on a divine mission, with history—and eternity—on their side.

As Egypt has shown, the real danger is not always in what they say today, but in what they believe about tomorrow.

So yes, celebrate the temporary calm. But do not drop your guard. Because for groups driven by ideology more than pragmatism, every pause is just another step toward their return.