The Islamic Republic and trust: An impossible combination

There is a mistake many still make when speaking about Iran. They turn the argument into theology, as if the central question were a religious word like taqiyya. 

That misses the point. The issue is not doctrine. The issue is conduct. On March 23, 2026, President Trump said there were major points of agreement in talks with Iran and opened a five day diplomatic window, while Tehran publicly denied that any talks were taking place at all. 

When one side says negotiations are advancing and the other says the negotiations do not even exist, trust is not diplomacy. Trust is self deception.

And the danger is far larger than the nuclear file alone. The Islamic Republic is not just a regime with uranium stockpiles. It is a regime that has shown its willingness to weaponize geography itself. 

On March 23, Reuters reported that Bahrain circulated a draft United Nations Security Council resolution authorizing force to protect shipping around the Strait of Hormuz after Iranian attacks on vessels and attempts to impede navigation. 

That waterway carries about one fifth of global oil supplies. On the same day, Iran’s Defence Council warned that any attack on its southern coast or islands would lead to mine laying that would effectively shut access routes across the Gulf. This is not normal statecraft. It is strategic blackmail aimed at the world economy.

The same logic applies to ballistic missiles. Iran possesses one of the largest missile arsenals in the Middle East. These are not abstract symbols. 

They are the delivery systems that turn ideology into coercion and coercion into death. A regime that threatens sea lanes, terrorizes civilian populations with missile fire, and uses escalation as leverage is not a regime asking to be trusted. It is a regime demanding to be feared.

Then comes the nuclear question, which is the most dangerous of all because it sits at the intersection of concealment, time, and force. The IAEA said in February that Iran had 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched to up to 60 percent, and Reuters reported that by the agency’s yardstick this is enough material, if enriched further, for 10 nuclear weapons. 

The IAEA has also said Iran has not provided the required accounting for what happened to that stockpile and has still not granted access to key bombed sites such as Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan. Grossi warned that without engagement he could reach a point where he would have no idea where the material is. 

That is the real scandal. Not rhetoric. Not slogans. Not wishful diplomacy. A stockpile with bomb potential and an inspection regime that still cannot verify its status.

So let us be honest about what this regime represents. It is not only a problem of enriched uranium. It is a system built on layers of pressure: control over a vital maritime chokepoint, a massive ballistic missile arsenal, and a nuclear program whose most dangerous material is still not fully accounted for. 

The Strait of Hormuz is the chokehold. The missiles are the instrument. The enriched uranium is the strategic insurance policy. Put them together and the message is obvious: this is a regime that uses ambiguity, fear, and disruption as tools of power.

That is why the free world must stop speaking in the language of trust. With the Islamic Republic, trust is not a policy. Verification is a policy. 

Pressure is a policy. Immediate inspections are a policy. Removal or dilution of highly enriched uranium is a policy. Automatic consequences for cheating are a policy. Anything less is not peace. It is an invitation to the next crisis, the next deception, and perhaps one day the next bomb.

At the end, the truth is simple. A regime that can deny negotiations while negotiating, threaten to choke the world’s energy artery, point ballistic missiles at cities, and leave enough near bomb grade material unaccounted for to alarm the IAEA has forfeited the right to be trusted. 

It can be dealt with. It can be pressured. It can be contained. But it cannot be trusted.