Western capitals are fond of stagecraft: a well-timed summit, a photograph with leaders, a ringing communiqué. But in the Middle East, applause does not translate into capacity. When statements replace structures, the result is spectacle — not security.
Recent French diplomatic moves illustrate the problem.
Paris has announced plans to co-chair a high-level New York conference on a two-state outcome alongside Saudi leadership, a gesture meant to signal momentum. Announcements like that can create political heat; they do not, by themselves, create enforceable commitments.
The Arab League is useful as a forum, but it is not a supranational security provider.
Its charter makes clear that decisions bind only those states that accept them; there is no standing command, no common budget, and no mechanism to compel compliance. In short: a communiqué cannot substitute for troops, audits, or verifiable chains of custody.
That institutional weakness shows up in practice. The Bahrain Declaration of May 2024, for example, made strong demands — an immediate ceasefire, UN forces, and a roadmap toward statehood — but offered no enforcement architecture or named agencies to carry out the work. Declarations expose consensus; they rarely resolve who will pay, who will command, or who will be held to account.
Reliance on optics grows riskier when summit seriousness depends on the attendance of a single leader. Reports that Saudi staff were asked to prepare for Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s potential presence at the New York conference underline how easily strategy can hinge on a photo op.
When “maybe he’ll come” is the proof of concept, the plan’s substance rides on an uncertain guest list rather than on enforceable mechanisms.
History confirms the limits of stagecraft.
The Arab League has repeatedly readmitted previously isolated regimes even while underlying regional cleavages persisted — a case in point being Syria’s return after years of suspension. Reintegrations may reflect shifting geopolitics; they do not erase rivalries that impede joint action.
If Western governments want durable outcomes, they must change the unit of diplomacy. Work capital by capital, tie every pledge to named actors and budgets, and build independent verification.
Egypt and Jordan control the border mechanisms that matter for Israeli security; Gulf treasuries can back reconstruction if funds are conditional and auditable. Scale what works, don’t announce what simply looks good.
Leadership in the region is less about podiums than about plumbing: who audits the aid, who commands the checkpoint, who verifies disarmament.
Photo-ops may comfort domestic audiences and burnish reputations — but when lives depend on durable security, only instruments with teeth will do.